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Abstract 
Game-theoretic models of marketing channels typically rely on simplifying assumptions that, 
from a behavioral perspective, often appear naïve. However, behavioral researchers have 
produced such an abundance of behavioral regularities that they are impossible to incorporate 
into game-theoretic models. We believe that a focus on three core findings would benefit both 
fields; these are: First, beliefs that are held by the various players regarding profit consequences 
of different actions are incomplete and often biased; second, players’ preferences and 
optimization objectives are not commonly known; and third, players have insufficient cognitive 
abilities to achieve optimization objectives. Embracing these three findings shifts the focus from 
rational decision making to how decision makers learn to improve their decision making skills. 
Concluding, we believe that greater convergence of game-theoretic modeling and behavioral 
research in marketing channels would lead to new insights for both fields. 
 
Keywords: marketing channels, game theory, behavioral decision research 
 Introduction 
Manufacturers sell goods and services through multiple channels. As a result, marketing mix 
decisions are affected not just by the anticipated reactions of the targeted customer base but also 
by the behavior of other channel members involved in the transaction, such as retailers and 
competitors. Over the years a large literature has emerged in both economics and marketing 
science using game theoretical tools to analyze the optimal behavior of channel members (e.g., 
Basu et al. 2005; Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Lal 1990; McGuire and Staelin 1983; Moorthy 1993; 
Raju and Zhang 2005). While this work varies in its substantive focus, it has been unified by two 
common interests: 1) explaining why we observe the market-channel structures that we do; and 
2) offering prescriptive advice for how firms can achieve higher profits either by better 
coordinating actions within existing channel structures or adopting new structures. 
However, the degree to which game-theoretic modeling work in channels has been successful 
in achieving these goals has been a matter of increasing debate. The core concern is that game-
theoretic models of agent behavior tend to be built on a set of assumptions about how managers, 
employees, and consumers make decisions that seem, at times, remote from the views of 
decision making provided by behavioral economists and psychologists. Whereas game theory 
typically presumes managers to be highly-knowledgeable, far-sighted, optimizers (e.g., Basu et 
al. 2005; Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Lal 1990; McGuire and Staelin 1983; Moorthy 1993; Raju 
and Zhang 2005), experimental research in decision making more often finds them to be 
comparatively unknowledgeable, short-sighted, satisficers—agents who might share the 
economists’ goal of choosing actions that maximize profits and utility, but who lack the 
cognitive skills to do so in the manner prescribed by game theory (e.g., Meyer and Banks 1997; 
Kunreuther et al. 2002; Ho et al. 2006). 
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 Because historically there has been limited formal interaction between game-theoretic and 
behavioral researchers in the study of channel-management, the empirical implications of 
incorporating more realistic behavioral assumptions to the theoretical models remain uncertain. 
Thaler (2008) recently noted that, while research in finance has enjoyed considerable success 
blending traditional normative methods with insights from behavioral economics (e.g., Barberis 
and Thaler 2003), there has been only limited analogous convergence in marketing. Controlled 
experimental tests of the predictions of game-theoretic models of channel management, for 
example, have only begun to appear (see, e.g., Amaldoss et al. 2000; Ghosh and John 2000; Ho 
and Zhang 2009). However, papers that recognize the effect of behavioral regularities in 
traditional game-theoretic models of channel coordination (e.g., Cui, Raju, and Zhang 2007; Ho 
et al. 2006; Ho and Zhang 2008) suggest that very different equilibria and prescriptions for the 
optimal design of channels might emerge. At the same time, we believe that game-theoretic 
models can provide alternative explanations for behavioral regularities (e.g., Banks, Hutchinson, 
and Meyer 2002), which is why greater convergence between both fields will be beneficial to 
both sides. 
In this paper we aim to take a first step toward achieving such a convergence. The specific 
goals were threefold. The first was to select from the abundance of behavioral regularities those 
that are most crucial to the assumption of game-theoretic modeling. The second was to explore 
the implication of these findings for the descriptive validity of game-theoretic models. The 
third—and most important—goal was to develop an agenda for future research that tries to better 
blend game-theoretic and descriptive approaches to understanding the behavior of agents within 
channel networks. 
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 1. Game-theoretic Models of Channel Management and Behavioral Research 
We define the field of theoretical channel-management broadly to include any attempt to 
characterize the rational behavior of firms and agents within multi-tiered production and sales-
distribution networks. Questions that might arise, for example, include the conditions under 
which manufacturers would find it optimal to sell its goods through its own versus independent 
retailers, how to design wholesale pricing contracts that jointly maximize the profits of retailers 
and manufacturers, and how to design sales-force compensation schemes that jointly maximize 
the profits of the manufacturer and the net income of the sales agent. 
Regardless of one’s specific modeling focus, however, all game-theoretic treatments of such 
problems begin by making a series of assumptions about:  
1. The number of players and their relationships (the composition and structure of the 
channel network); 
2. The beliefs held by the various players about the profit consequences of different actions 
(e.g., the form of the demand curve or the relationship between sales effort and sales); 
3. The optimization objective held by the players (e.g., the assumptions made about players’ 
preferences); and 
4. The cognitive abilities of game players (e.g., the assumptions made about strategic 
reasoning and inter-temporal discounting). 
Whereas behavioral researchers are typically forgiving of game theorists for making simplifying 
assumptions for the first assumption—for example, modeling the case of a small number of 
idealized manufacturers and retailers rather than a complex real-world market—concerns arise 
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 with respect to the behavioral validity that are typically invoked for assumptions (2) through (4). 
We consider the basis of these concerns.  
 
2.1 What do Players know? Behavioral Evidence on Common Knowledge Assumptions 
Game-theoretic models of channel management are typically grounded on a set of strong 
assumptions about the knowledge that managers have about consumers, competitors, and the 
behavior of agents in a market. For example, most theoretical analyses of channel coordination 
begin by assuming that all market participants have common knowledge about the structure of 
consumer demand, such as that it is a downward-sloping linear function of the form Q=α-βP 
whose parameters α and β are known with certainty by all players (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 
1984; Raju and Zhang 2005). Likewise, classic models of optimal sales-force compensation 
typically begin by assuming that sales (x) are given by the linear function x=h+ke+ε where e is 
the level of effort expended by a sales person, h and k are scaling parameters, and ε is an 
unobserved random disturbance—a function that is assumed to be known both by the firm and its 
sales agents. 
Empirical evidence on the degree to which real-world firms have such accurate (i.e., 
unbiased) common knowledge about the behavior of consumers, competitors, and channel 
members is mixed. When the information in question is quantifiable and objectively observable, 
empirical investigations have found that business parties are often remarkably accurate in their 
beliefs. For example, Porac et al. (1995) show that Scottish knitwear manufacturers hold accurate 
perceptions of their competitors’ product characteristics, and generally agree on their 
understanding of rivalry in their market. Likewise, John and Reve (1982) show that key 
informants in a business dyad are accurate in their perceptions of objective “structural measures” 
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 such as centralization or formalization. Finally, one assumes that most large firms with the 
resources to track and model sales-response have at least a cursory knowledge of the shape of the 
demand function they face, at least for well-established products. 
Such knowledge assumptions are less likely to hold, however, when information is subjective 
and less easy to observe. For example, in an extensive dataset of principal-agent relationships in 
the insurance industry, Vosgerau, Anderson, and Ross (2008) find that in 34% of these long-
lasting relationships channel members believed that their channel counterparts were more 
committed to, and had more invested in, the relationship than the counterpart actually had. 
Conversely, in 55% of these relationships channel members underestimated their counterparts’ 
commitment to and investment in the relationship. Such misbeliefs have not only been observed 
for relationship characteristics but also for beliefs about how marketing tactics (such as price 
changes) will likely affect consumer demand. Firms launching new products, for example, 
typically over-estimate the sales they are likely to realize (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1993), and 
managers are often prone to under-estimate the likelihood that competitors will respond to 
unilateral price decreases (e.g., Armstrong and Collopy 1996). 
Of course, one might conjecture that such biases will quickly vanish given trading experience 
in a market, but empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, the opposite is more likely to hold 
true. As Vosgerau et al. (2008) demonstrate, channel members fail to update faulty beliefs 
because managers are often overconfident about the accuracy of their priors—a bias that is well-
supported in psychology (e.g., Soll and Klayman 2004), marketing (e.g., Mahajan 1992), 
organizational behavior (e.g., Sutcliffe 1994), behavioral economics (e.g., Schumpeter 1942; cf., 
also Thaler 2000), and finance (e.g., Goel and Thakor 2008). For example, overconfidence has 
been shown to lead decision makers to enter markets when they should not have (Camerer & 
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 Lovallo 1999), and to cause CEOs to overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but to 
curtail investment when they require external financing (Malmendier & Tate 2005). 
If managers are overconfident in the accuracy of their beliefs, they will, of course, be 
unmotivated to gather new information that could prove them wrong, or selectively attend to 
information that is likely to support their prior beliefs (see, e.g., Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). 
Urbany, Kordupleski, and Davis (2008), for example, find that executives often express a high 
degree of surprise when required to interview customers regarding competitor positions in their 
markets. The majority report that customer interviews changed the way they thought about 
customers, suggested needs they had not thought of before, and had a subsequent impact on their 
decisions. In evaluating post-hoc why prior beliefs vary so much from actual customer beliefs, 
executives are most likely to cite limited search due to strong priors as the primary reason (i.e., 
“we already know what customers want and don’t need to ask”). 
However, even if channel members are motivated to develop unbiased beliefs, they will 
clearly do so only to the extent that information about consumers, competitors, and collaborative 
channel partners is available and unbiased. In many instances, however, such information is 
difficult to gather or might be deliberately obfuscated by channel members in order to strengthen 
bargaining positions. For example, Banks, Hutchinson, and Meyer (2002) introduce a formal 
game-theoretic model of repeated transactions bargaining with 2-sided uncertainty to analyze 
what type of reputation is best for a buyer or seller (in organizational markets) to take to the 
bargaining table when engaged in a marketing channel interaction. The authors determined how 
reputations would affect equilibrium strategies and payoffs. While, in general, the best reputation 
for the seller is one that makes the buyer nearly certain in a belief that the seller's cost is high, the 
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 best reputation for the buyer is one that makes the seller believe that there is a significant chance 
that he/she is willing to pay a high price. 
Finally, the exchange and aggregation of information has greatly increased due to 
advancement in information technology and data collection methods. Information is not only 
shared among channel members but more importantly across channels. Companies like 
ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and LexisNexis buy and sell consumer data from and to government 
agencies (e.g., Homeland Security Department, intelligence agencies), banks, insurance agencies, 
telecommunication companies, biometric and DNA sampling companies, retailers, and credit 
bureaus. This information is used for background screening of costumers (i.e., credit checks) and 
employees, profiling of costumers, and purchase tracking. It allows companies to micro-target 
costumers, to better estimate demand and advertising elasticities, and to increase costumer life 
time value by selectively offering services and products (cf., Acquisti and Varian 2005). 
However, while privacy of information is largely unregulated in the US (as opposed to Europe), 
the free exchange of information may be hampered by potential consumer backlash due to 
privacy violations. For example, in the notorious Amazon.com price discrimination 
“experiment” in September 2000, Amazon’s apparent manipulation of DVD prices based on 
customers’ purchase histories backfired after some buyers realized they had paid higher prices 
than others (see Streifield 2001).  
Consumer backlash and channel members’ reluctance to share information make it difficult 
to predict what will be the effect of the explosion in data availability on channel behavior and 
performance. Will channels become more efficient due to decreased uncertainty about costumers 
and demand? Can channel conflict be easier mitigated? For which industries and/or product 
categories will traditional channels be abandoned in favor of direct marketing? Complicating 
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 these matters is the fact that what constitutes a privacy violation for consumers is as malleable as 
consumers’ unstable and context-dependent preferences that behavioral economists have 
uncovered in much decision making. For example, immediate gratification lowers the probability 
that consumers will act on their privacy concerns (Acquisti 2004), and changing the wording of 
the question or the answer-format changes consumers’ willingness to disclose private 
information (Leslie, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2008). In most cases, it is the request for 
personally identifying information that irks consumers: Ackerman, Cranor, and Reagle (1999) 
found that respondents are less willing to provide information online when personally 
identifiable information is also requested. Consumers rightly fear that sensitive personal data 
(such as credit card or social security numbers) may be compromised (e.g., identity theft). In 
other cases, consumers’ concerns are triggered by behavioral profiling (cf., Spiekermann 2006), 
such as simple observation of online behavior (e.g., time spent on a certain page) or personal but 
not uniquely identifying information (e.g., ZIP code of a web visitor inferred from her IP 
address). 
Concluding, channel members might be overconfident in the accuracy of their beliefs about 
costumers, other channel members, and competitors, leading to biased beliefs that are not 
updated because managers rarely seek out information that might disconfirm their prior beliefs. 
Furthermore, channel members might not be willing to provide unbiased information to others, 
and the free flow of information might be hampered by privacy concerns. Research on what 
constitutes privacy violations, how consumers react to such violations, and how data can be 
aggregated, shared, and used among channel members is very much in its infancy. We believe 
that the field of data aggregation, exchange, and privacy concerns will become critically 
important for marketing and marketing channels in the next few decades. 
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2.2 What is being Optimized? Reference Dependence, Loss Aversion, and Social 
Preferences 
Probably the most important contribution from behavioral research to game-theoretic 
modeling has been the formalization of reference dependence and loss aversion (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; cf., also Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006). Reference price dependence has been 
empirically demonstrated in marketing contexts (e.g., Kalyanaram and Winer 1995) and, 
together with loss aversion, incorporated in consumer choice models (e.g., Hardie, Johnson, and 
Fader 1993). However, few game-theoretic models of marketing channels to date incorporate 
these behavioral regularities (exceptions are Shi and Xiao 2008, and Wang and Webster 2007), 
even though they have been shown to affect coordination in marketing channels (Ho and Zhang 
2008). For example, the simplest form of nonlinear pricing contracts that achieve coordination in 
a dyadic channel is a two-part tariff that consists of a lump-sum fixed fee and a marginal 
wholesale per-unit price (Moorthy 1987). Ho and Zhang (2008) argue that reference dependence 
and loss aversion lead manufacturers to charge a fixed fee that is too low, and, to maintain 
profitability, charge a marginal wholesale price that is too high, which then increases the 
likelihood of retailers to reject the contract offer. Thus, actual efficiency may be much lower 
than predicted by game-theoretic models based on the standard expected utility framework. 
However, behavioral regularities do not always hinder channel coordination. Behavioral 
economics and psychology have shown that most people are not purely self-interested but care 
about equality and fairness. Such social preferences can help to replace complicated contracts 
that would be needed if players were purely self-interested. For example, Fehr, Klein, and 
Schmidt (2007) have shown that fairness and equality concerns can render implicit bonus 
9 
 contracts in sales force compensation superior to explicit incentive contracts. Likewise, Cui, 
Raju, and Zhang (2007) consider the case of traditional dyadic channels where channel members 
care about the fairness or equality of profits. The authors show that in such cases complex 
pricing contracts (such as multi-part tariffs) are not required to achieve coordination: a simple 
contract where manufacturers set a simple wholesale price above marginal cost will do. 
Banks, Hutchinson, and Meyer (2002) offer an illustration of how game theory might play 
the reverse role of helping inform behavioral researchers about the evolutionary origin of 
fairness perceptions. The authors argue that concerns about fairness may have their origins in 
strategic bargaining behavior. The example they give is that of a merchant who suddenly raises 
price for an essential good well above their marginal costs (such as to exploit a shortage). 
Consumers typically see such increase as unfair, which causes them to walk away from such 
offers, even if the good is essential (e.g., Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). Banks et al. (2002) 
argue that such behavior could in fact be quite rational: the instinct of walking away from 
“unfair” transactions is simply nature’s way of instilling market discipline—a bargaining tactic 
that insures that prices will revert to equilibrium levels over repeated transactions. 
 
2.3 Cognitive Abilities of Game Players: Limits to Strategic Reasoning and Temporal 
Planning 
Central to all equilibrium analyses of channel structure is the assumption that managers and 
agents are capable of sophisticated strategic thinking. When making decisions, players are 
assumed to take into account how their actions will affect the decisions made by other players, 
and optimally exploit these conjectures under the assumption that competitive moves will also be 
optimal (Ho et al. 2006). As an illustration, when deciding what compensation plan to offer a 
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 sales representative, the representative is assumed to optimally allocate his or her effort in 
response to a given plan, and is offered the plan that maximizes this predicted effort (Basu et al. 
1985). Likewise, when deciding whether to offer promotions to consumers, analysts assume that 
consumers are able to anticipate the pricing actions of firms and make buying decisions that 
minimize average prices paid net inventory holding costs over a time horizon (e.g., Assuncao 
and Meyer 1993). 
Empirical tests of structural marketing models that assume optimal strategic thinking show 
that, at least for certain product categories, consumers act as if they are indeed forward-looking 
(Chintagunta et al. 2006). However, Chintagunta et al. (2006) conclude that “…The underlying 
structural assumptions (e.g., forward-looking behavior […]) are often not tested or further 
investigated.” Direct tests of strategic forward-looking cast doubt on the extent to which channel 
members do so. For example, managers have been found to under-estimate the likelihood that 
competitors will respond to unilateral price decreases (e.g., Armstrong and Collopy 1996). 
Montgomery et al. (2005) found evidence of managers' thinking about competitors’ past and 
future behavior, but little incidence of strategic competitive reasoning. Their results suggest that 
this is due to perceptions of low returns from anticipating competitor reactions more than to the 
high cost of doing so. Both, the difficulty of obtaining competitive information and the 
uncertainty associated with predicting competitor behavior, contribute to these perceptions. 
The factors that limit the ability of individuals to engage in strategic planning are generally 
seen as being threefold. The first, and most obvious, is limited cognitive capacity; as try as we 
might, we are naturally limited in the number of “steps” we can look ahead when making 
decisions. This idea is captured by Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) in their Cognitive Hierarchy 
(CH) Model of game-theoretic reasoning. In the CH model each player assumes that his strategy 
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 is the most sophisticated response to limited forward-reasoning by other players. The innovation 
of the model is that it allows empirical recovery of the number of cognitive “steps” that seem to 
best describe competitive behavior in games. The model has been found to fit data from 
experimental games quite well, and yields a somewhat disturbing finding about the strategic 
reasoning ability of game participants: for many games the average number of forward-reasoning 
steps is 1.5—a depth of thinking far short of that assumed by most game theortic models. In a 
recent empirical test of the cognitive hierarchy model, Goldfarb and Yang (2009) develop a 
structural econometric model that estimates the level of strategic thinking. Estimation of the 
model on 2,233 decisions of managers at Internet Service providers to offer 56K modems to 
customers in 1997 shows that firms with higher levels of strategic thinking were more likely to 
have survived through April 2007. Strategic ability is also shown to affect marketing outcomes: 
A simulated increase in strategic thinking means that fewer firms offer the technology to 
costumers. 
A second factor that inhibits strategic reasoning abilities is that even in cases where we do 
manage to contemplate outcomes that lie in the distant future, we are often poor at predicting the 
preferences we will have at those points. Gilbert and Wilson (2007) and Loewenstein and 
Schkade (1999), for example, offer evidence that when people are asked to predict the 
preferences they will have in the future, they often err by being overly influenced by how they 
feel in the present. As a result, consumers are prone to such biases as over-buying product 
features that seem attractive at first sight but that are later never used (e.g., Meyer, Zhao, and 
Han 2008), and under-predict the degree to which they will adapt to new life situations (e.g., 
Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). Likewise, in the context of the internet as a low search and 
transaction cost channel, Zauberman (2003) demonstrated that consumer lock-in can arise 
12 
 because consumers under-predict the impact of future switching costs that they have created by 
an initial selection of an online retailer. Consumers not only err when predicting their own future 
preferences, they are also not very good in predicting others’ preferences, even when judges and 
targets know each other well (e.g., Davis, Hoch, and Ragsdale 1986). Limited ability to take on a 
counterpart’s perspective also seems to occur among channel members. In the previously 
mentioned dataset of principal-agent relationships in the insurance industry (Vosgerau et al. 
2008), 34% of channel members over-predicted and 55% under-predicted their channel 
counterparts’ relational closeness. For managers who are attempting to predict the strategic 
response of competitive firms, such biased perspective taking could clearly have damaging 
consequences. 
The third factor is the long-documented tendency for individuals to place greater weight on 
immediate versus delayed outcomes when making decisions. There has been deal of research 
showing that extremely high discounting is common and that consumers’ intertemporal 
preferences are context dependent (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992). In particular, while normative 
computations of the present value of future profit streams reflect the idea that profits earned 
today should indeed be given more weight than those that might be earned tomorrow, the typical 
assumption is that discount rates are constant. However, one of the most robust finding in the 
area is a tendency termed hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), in which 
subjective discount rates are not constant, but rather are disproportionately large for short 
postponements from the present. 
More recent work has tried to go beyond empirical irregularities compared to the normative 
discounted utility model and offer more insights into the underlying process, with the goal of 
providing more insights into managerial and policy decisions (e.g., Lynch and Zauberman 2006). 
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 The proposed mechanisms point to the role of affect (e.g., Loewenstein 1996) as well as more 
cognitive factors (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003, Malkoc and Zauberman 2004, Zauberman and 
Lynch 2005). Yet these mechanisms, while differ in the proposed psychological mechanism, all 
focus on the devaluations of outcomes over a given time horizon. In recent work Zauberman, 
Kim, Malkoc, and Bettman (2009) suggest that the source of such effects may not be the weight 
that is given to delays of different length but rather psychophysical distortions of time itself.  
 
Discussion 
This paper was motivated by a desire to foster a greater confluence between game-theoretic 
and behavioral approaches to the study of agent behavior in channels. We began by noting that 
an often-cited limitation of game-theoretic models is that they are based on assumptions about 
the decision making skills of agents that are overly naïve. Whereas behavioral researchers have 
found managers and consumers to be myopic and comparatively unknowledgeable when making 
decisions, game-theoretic models are based on the assumption that they are far-sighted and well-
informed, choosing those actions that optimize long-term profits. Yet, the question of whether 
game-theoretic models of markets have empirical value is much more muddled than this 
dichotomy of perspectives would seem to imply. To defend their craft, game-theorists are quick 
to point out that formal theories based on naïve assumptions about decision making may 
nevertheless serve as good as-if models of markets. 
To elaborate on this idea, a persistent result of research in inductive learning over the years is 
that individuals can often learn to make choices that are indistinguishable from those which 
would be made by an optimal decision maker even if the actual decision process is anything but 
optimal (e.g., Estes 1982; Fudenberg and Levine 1999; Hogarth  and Karelaia 2007). The 
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 explanation is simple: in many cases all that is needed to learn optimal behavior is to possess the 
instinct to repeat behaviors that tend to yield positive outcomes in the past and avoid those that 
yield negative outcomes. Hence, a young sales-force manager with no training in agency theory 
would likely discover quite quickly that his or her sales force will exert little effort if offered a 
compensation package that makes wages independent of effort, and that the greater the 
uncertainty in rewards for effort, the more he or she would need to offer the sales force a stable 
income floor. 
Yet, this result comes with a catch: trial-and-error learning rules support convergence to 
rational equilibria only if the learning environment is sufficiently supportive. Formally, 
convergence will occur if: 
1. Decision makers are not overconfident in the accuracy of their beliefs, that is they are 
motivated to seek out information that might change their beliefs; 
2. The optimal policy is among the intuitive decision rules considered by the decision 
maker; 
3. Application of that policy consistently yields rewards that are superior to those 
yielded by other policies; 
4. Feedback information is unbiased and available; and 
5. There are sufficient decision replicates to allow convergence. 
And therein lies the catch: in most real-world settings conditions (1) to (4) will only periodically 
hold, and condition (5) will rarely hold. Inhibiting condition (2), for example, will be a tendency 
for managers with short personal time horizons to experiment with new policies that depart from 
historical norms. Likewise by definition, equilibrium policies will not always yield the highest 
observable profit outcome for all possible competitive counter-moves; “best strategies” 
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 sometimes lose. Unbiased feedback information may be difficult to obtain due to privacy-related 
limits on data collection or deliberate obfuscation by other players. Finally, and most obviously, 
few managers and firms have the luxury of learning by trial and error over long time horizons; in 
many cases a firm can learn for only as long as they can avoid making market mistakes. 
Does this imply that analytic model approaches to channel management are of limited value? 
To the contrary, our view is that game-theoretic modeling tools play a vital role in future 
attempts to gain a richer descriptive and prescriptive view of behavior in channel networks. The 
difference, however, is that if progress is to be made, these tools have to be applied with the 
presumption that markets will rarely satisfy the classic assumptions of full-information 
equilibria—markets where managers have short time horizons, where they are uncertain about 
how markets and competitors will respond to their actions, and where few opportunities exist to 
learn from mistakes. For this to happen, of course, game-theoretic modelers must be prepared to 
integrate their work with that of behavioral researchers for whom the study of decision making 
under such limitations has been the focus. More specifically, future analytic and behavioral work 
on channel management would benefit from a greater focus on the following kinds of issues: 
Learning Processes. Over the past twenty years there has been active growth in both the 
study of the economic equilibria that arise under different assumptions about naïve learning 
processes (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1999), and the processes that characterize naïve learning 
(e.g., Ho et al. 2006). Perhaps surprisingly, there have been few applications of these ideas and 
methods to the study of behavior in marketing channels. Their obvious advantage is that they 
offer a means by which we might gain insights into both the kind of channel structures that might 
arise given naïve agents as well as the empirical shape of the path to various equilibria. 
16 
 As an example, a criticism that is often leveled at game theoretic models of channel 
behavior is that they offer an over-simplified view of the nature of real-world competition as 
defined by the number of players, the rules of engagement, and knowledge held by players. The 
usual defense of simplification is mathematical tractability; the more complex the system, the 
more difficult it is to use traditional mathematical methods to solve for equilibrium behavior 
within such systems. Recent advances in applying automata theory to games (e.g., Ghnemat et al. 
2007), however, could provide a solution to this dilemma. In this approach, markets are assumed 
to be comprised of a population of bounded-rational agents who adjust their play strategies to 
exploit what is observed about the decisions made by others in the localized environment. While 
the results lack the mathematical precision of traditional game-theoretic analyses (which seek, 
e.g., closed-form representations of the equilibrium prices), this is offset by the ability to study 
likely behavior in complex systems that are far more realistic than those considered to date. 
Environmental uncertainty. Above we noted that one of the most problematic aspects of 
traditional analytic models of channel behavior is the assumption that players hold high levels of 
knowledge about both the nature of market demand and the strategic sophistication of 
competitors. It is important to emphasize, however, that such assumptions are by no means 
inherent to game-theoretic analyses; analysts could just as easily assume that knowledge of the 
surrounding world goes no further than a set of highly uncertain priors that are updated over time 
through experience (e.g., Banks et al. 2002). Such extensions, however, come at the cost of a 
significant increase in mathematical complexity. Rather than being solvable as a one-period 
game, allowing agents to strategically learn about consumers and competitors implies that the 
analyst is now facing a multi-period game where firms and consumers can strategically choose 
actions that offer the most efficient approaches to learning (e.g., Villas-Boas 2004). 
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 Another source of uncertainty that may be considered in future work is that over the 
structure of the strategic game itself. A universal property of all game-theoretic analyses of 
channel coordination is that participants have common knowledge of the rules of play, such as 
the order of decisions (e.g., whether prices are set via a Stackelberg or Bertrand process), the 
objectives of all players, and the nature of the payoff matrix given those objectives. It is easy to 
imagine that in some settings, however, competitive firms differ not just in their utility functions 
but also in their beliefs about what game is being played. To illustrate, while a firm may believe 
that profits in an industry are best characterized by a coordination game, they may also believe 
that there is a chance that their competitor thinks that they are engaged in a prisoners’ dilemma—
an uncertain belief that fundamentally alter the kind of strategic decision that is made. An 
important area for future research is to explore the kinds of conjectures that managers have about 
the forces that drive profitability in an industry (the game that is being played), and how 
uncertainty in these conjectures affects decision making. 
The role of social preferences on strategic decisions. Finally, future work should more 
broadly consider how traditional game-theoretic models might be generalized to consider a range 
of known influences on decision making that lie outside the traditional domain of individual 
profit-maximization. Above we noted that considerable progress has been made in integrating 
one such influence, that of fairness considerations (Cui, Raju, and Zhang 2007). But clearly this 
is just a start. Usually overlooked in game-theoretic models, for example, are the role that social 
norms play in decision making. As an example, a long-standing weakness of agency-theoretic 
models of sales force compensation plans is that they make no allowance for the possible role 
that trust plays in setting contracts; a sales agent faced with a fixed compensation scheme may 
still exert high levels of effort out of a communal sense of responsibility, and the firm itself may 
18 
 avoid moving to commission-based plans out of a fear that doing so will signal a lack of trust in 
their part (cf., Fehr et al. 2007). 
Of course, there would seem an almost limitless number of such extensions one could 
consider, and therein lies the value of a closer interaction between behavioral and game-theoretic 
researchers in channels. In many cases, non-normative effects can be both accommodated and 
better understood using the tools of game theory, but only given the benefit of strong guidance 
from behavioral research. As an example, one might argue that trust in sales-force contracts 
could be modeled as arising from employees and firms playing a multi-period game where 
players find it in their best personal interest to make sacrifices in the short run (such as exerting 
extra effort with a direct reward in compensation) in order to maximize utility in the long run. 
The problem, however, is that other stories could be told as well. One could model the same 
effect by assuming that trust exists by the same mechanisms that superstitions persist—by a lack 
of willingness to test a hypothesis about potential harms that, if proven correct, could have 
catastrophic personal consequences (Fudenberg and Levine 2006). Guidance as to which of these 
routes to explanation is to be the most promising is provided by having a deep understanding of 
the psychological basis of such effects—something that is the traditional domain of behavioral 
research. 
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